MA Terrorism revision 2

Near and far enemy - why radical Islamist became global towards the US

Leadership transitions - weakly institutionalised groups are at risk most during this period, as roles are in flux

Genealogy of Radical Islam, the history and how the past was adapted to suit modern narratives

al-Utaybi group in Saudi Arabia laid ground works for globalised Jihad

SMT main text - made up of political opportunities, framing and mobilising resources

Ideology is flexible in terrorist groups, to interpret social identity and justify violence

Blowback effect of fighters returning, Mujahideen experience in 80s creates foreign fighters. Tried to equate goals of jihad to anti-Russian conflicts like Chechnya. Khattab focus on North Caucasus so didn't care about US. Chechens never join transnational wars in Afghanistan for example

Azzam as leader who globalised Islamic movement, political shifts in 70s cause pan-Islamism

A person who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid.

non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who enter a conflict zone to participate in hostilities, driven by motives such as religion, kinship, or ideology rather than financial gain.

Foreign fighters usually opt to fight abroad than at home, returners are highly effective. Those who stay to fight at home are usually radicalised by foreign fighters themselves

Osama still matters, decapitation is still useful in destroying movements

Destroying terrorism at a movement level is much more important, menace is from loose-knit cells in the West

Tertiary model for counter-terrorism, using case of Israel

Violence from a relationship between social movements, countermovements, and state repression. Ineffective policing forcing activists into clandestine actions

Bifocal focus of West on grassroots movements due to decrease of Al-Qaeda. Move from global command to pressure on radicalised individuals

Al-Qaeda is unique due to its fluid structure and expert use of modern communication

Three schools of militant Islamist radicalisation: SMT, French sociology, case studies

Circles of threat: core leadership, similar local movements, radicalised individuals

Foreign fighters: Noncitizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict: DEFENSIVE MOBILISATION, GLOBAL UMMAH COMMUNITY AT THREAT

Suppression, accommodation, criminalisation. Terrorism as a post-Cold war power shift than a new phenomenon.

Breivik attacks in Norway, glorified by extremists in Russia than in Western Europe

UK Counterterrorism strategy involving Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare

Democratic states struggle to implement strategies through fear of impinging rights

Research into terrorism is stagnating due to secondary data use and government narratives

Stigma helps extreme right groups form tight knit organisations due to costs of joining

Tactical, moral and organisational reasons for internal breaks in groups

Coercive vs persuasive models, democratic states tend to lean for coercive to reassure public

Better to opt for desistence than deradicalisation as it is easier to get someone to stop violence than stop believing