NW practice

#1 reason for no prolif: preventative strike, uncommitted ally, nuclear umbrella coercion

#2 reason: domestic pathologies, risk of failure, internal divisions prefers hedging umbrella

#2 arguing globalisation acts as domestic block, as actors internally would rather open up to the world and not face sanctions.

#3 cost of acquisition is sky high, both politically and economically (leads on from Sollingen)

#3 NPT hampers domestic idealistic construction required for the demand of nukes - states build the same reason they have airlines

#3 COUNTER that 28/31 of potential proliferating events appear to lend themselves to security threats, is idealism that important?

#3 shift in international perception from France in 1950s

#3 COUNTER it is actually the physical components of the NPT e.g. declaring facilities and inspections that makes building quietly impossible - link back to risk of failure in point 2

Q2 OVERALL: international system anarchic, offsets military deficiencies, can be used for prestige purposes

Q2 UK: Blitz made UK feel vulnerable, Attlee saw nukes qualitatively

UK: threat of annihilation from vulnerability requires a nuke, UK naturally is a target as important ally of US. Important role in NATO

Trident: UK has operational capacity on its own, but Trident D5s and testing facilities come from US

UK keeps costs down this way, as France has complete independence whilst keeping ruinous costs away vs France 2-3x the cost.

Modern innovations e.g. underwater drones, AI and sensors, BMD makes current thought short termist. Normative international opinion turning vs UK interaction with ICJ discrediting countervalue strike.

Argentina never believed the UK would use nukes, therefore it appears very expensive for something with such tiny scope for usage?

Worrying about controllability of nuclear war by building smaller warheads just signals you are bluffing