| Hint | Answer | % Correct |
|---|---|---|
| Occurs BEFORE contract; individuals with higher risks are more likely to seek insurance, leading to skewed risk pool. | Adverse selection | 0%
|
| One party in a transaction has more or better information than the other. | Asymmetric information | 0%
|
| If transaction costs are low and property rights are well-defined, parties can negotiate to resolve externalities without legal intervention. | Coase Theorem | 0%
|
| Relief is given if a knowing party fails to inform an unknowing party, but only when disclosure is low-cost and no substantial investment in information was made. | Doctrine of mistake | 0%
|
| A cost-benefit formula used to determine negligence: liability exists if the burden of prevention is less than the probability of harm multiplied by its severity. | Hand formula | 0%
|
| Insured may not profit from insurance; only actual losses are compensated. Exceptions include life insurance policies and agreed-sum policies | Indemnity | 0%
|
| The insured must stand to lose something from the event insured against; prevents gambling, moral hazard, and externalities to uninvolved third parties. | Insurable interest | 0%
|
| Insurance does NOT cover deliberate or criminal actions to reduce incentives for harmful behaviour | Intentional acts | 0%
|
| Arises AFTER contract is signed; individuals may take more risks because they are insured , making it difficult for the insurer to verify care levels | Moral hazard | 0%
|
| The insured must disclose ALL relevant information; strict sanctions apply for non-disclosure | Utmost good faith | 0%
|
| Contractual tool where the informed party assumes the risk of quality or performance, used to correct information asymmetry. | Warranties | 0%
|