| Question | Tile | Select | % Correct |
|---|---|---|---|
| English Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | Yes | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | An open, descending-price auction where the price starts high and falls until someone accepts it. | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | Yes | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | An public, open, ascending-price auction, highest bidder pays their bid and wins | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | Yes | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Bidder has one private bid. The highest bidder wins, pays the second-highest bid. Truth telling doms | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | Yes | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Bidders place bids on bundled items rather than only single items. Useful for complements, complex | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Combinatorial auction where bidders bid on packages as single bundles. Joint values > sum separately | Yes | 0%
|
| English Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | Yes | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Each bidder submits one private bid without seeing others’ bids. Highest bidder wins, pays own bid. | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | Yes | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Multiple auctions at same time over multiple rounds. Bidders switch across items as prices evolve | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | Yes | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Multiple identical units. Winners pay same market-clearing price, highest lose bid or lowest win bid | No | 0%
|
| English Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| First Price Sealed Bid Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey auction (second price sealed bid) | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Uniform Price-Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Dutch Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Simultaneous Multi-Round Action (SMR) | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Combinatorial Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|
| Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | Yes | 0%
|
| Package Auction | Multi-unit extension second-price logic. Bidders bid for several units, pays opport. cost on others | No | 0%
|